Social Capital at Work: A Case of Adapting a Norwegian Cooperation Model in Russia by Mineev, Andrei & Bourmistrov, Anatoli
1 
 
 
Social capital at work: A case of adapting a Norwegian cooperation 
model in Russia 
By  
Postdoc, Dr. Andrey Mineev 
Bodø Graduate School of Business, University of Nordland, Norway 
and  
Professor, Dr. Anatoli Bourmistrov, 
Bodø Graduate School of Business, University of Nordland, Norway 
 
Abstract 
The paper examines a process of adapting a Norwegian cooperation model by the local industry in the 
Russian North. We found that the Russian way to build cooperation, far differently from the 
Norwegian practice, was characterized by intertwined personal and organizational ties, and by mixed 
political and business agendas. The empirical case was analyzed with help of a framework combining 
theories of social capital and Scandinavian institutionalism. On the base of this analysis, we challenge 
the established view of Russia as a country with low cooperation capacity and provide suggestions on 
how the Russian cooperation experience can be valuable in the West.   
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Weak legitimacy or absence of formal institutions still remains a key feature of the Russian business 
landscape, fostering dependence on informal institutions such as culture and ethics (Puffer & 
McCarthy, 2011). In particular, Puffer and McCarthy argue that Russian managers tend to rely 
excessively on informal institutions such as personal networks to conduct business. At best, the 
international business and management literature views informal networks as a temporary solution for 
transitional economies. But this mechanism must decline for an economy to move towards an 
established Western-like market economy (Chakrabarty, 2009). Analysed with help of theories and 
world views developed in the West, Russia with its networks tends to be understood in terms of 
inferiority, imbalance or deviation (see for example Crotty, 2006; Ledeneva, 1998, 2009; Puffer, 
McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010; Rose, 1998). This kind of approach is important for Western practitioners 
and policy makers who are supposed to cooperate with Russia, but it may limit the opportunity to learn 
from the Russian experience and extend existing theories of business and management.
1
 This paper 
seeks to contribute to the latter and, in doing so, presents the results of an empirical study of the 
adoption of a Western cooperation model in Russia. In this case, personal relationships and informal 
networks played a key role. 
The empirical study was implemented in the Murmansk region of the North-West Federal District of 
Russia. This region is the closest to the giant gas field Shtokman, located on the Russian side of the 
Barents Sea shelf. Responding to the government’s plans to develop Shtokman, in the second half of 
the 2000s, local companies in Murmansk mobilized in a regional supply industry association. The idea 
of this association was brought to Russia by Norwegian oil major Statoil, which used a Norwegian 
industry association as a prototype example for Russia. The local actors in Murmansk played an active 
role in the association project. Though started with support from Norway, with time this project 
became self-sufficient and driven by Russian actors in a way quite different from the Norwegian 
practice. Hence, a project initiated by Norway became a Russian project. An umbrella research 
                                                          
1
 Perhaps this is a reason for the declining frequency (and interest?) of Western publications on Russian business and 
management, as reported in a review by T. Badaeva, T. (2013). Management control systems in Russia: review and future 
directions. Paper presented at the 7th Conference on Performance Measurement and Management Control.  
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problem for this study is to understand the following: How do Russian actors make a project initiated 
by Norway a Russian project? 
Our analytical approach to the research problem combines elaborations of Scandinavian 
institutionalism and theory of social capital. Scandinavian institutionalism highlights organizational 
variation and distinctiveness rather than the isomorphism and standardization manifested by 
mainstream institutional theory (Boxenbaum & Strangaard Pedersen, 2009). A particular value of this 
approach for organizational studies is its processual, prejudice-free view on organizing, in contrast to a 
traditional, structure-oriented view of organization or organizational field (see e.g. Czarniawska, 2008, 
pp. 6-7). Thus, our unit of analysis is an organizing process associated with the implementation of a 
Norwegian project by Russian actors. Regarding social capital, this concept generally refers to the 
ability of people to work together in groups and organizations for a common purpose (Fukuyama, 
1995, p. 10). A core idea of the social capital theory is that social relationships have value (Putnam, 
2000, p. 19). Social capital is assumed to be a critical issue for understanding differences between 
OECD countries and developing countries (including transitional economies and Russia).
2
 Relating the 
ideas of social capital and the Scandinavian view on organizing, our research question in its general 
form is, how are different forms of social capital manifested in an organizing process in Russia? 
This paper is positioned in the East-West literature on Russia with a twofold contribution. First, our 
findings suggest that weak formal networks of social capital in Russia present not only challenges but 
also opportunities for innovative cooperation projects. In this respect, informal networks have a degree 
of freedom (which is rather absent in the West) to interpret their roles and formalize their relationships 
and can be used in a dynamic and creative way. This finding challenges the established view of Russia 
as a society with low cooperative capacity. In addition, we argue that the cooperation experience of 
Russia can be of value to Western economies. If formal organization in the West comes to a critical 
                                                          
2
 Refer to, for example, the Social Development Department of the World Bank, which has supported two significant 
research initiatives to understand, measure and assess the impact of social capital. Both the Social Capital Initiative and the 
Local Level Institutions Study supported community-focused research in developing countries (Source: World Bank). 
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point, its repair might require the mobilization of social capital resources in a way similar to what we 
found in our Russian case. 
Before presenting and discussing these findings in more detail, we introduce the reader to our 
analytical framework, the empirical context and the research methodology used to link our analysis 
and the data together. 
 
2. Towards an analytical framework 
2.1. Social capital 
Social capital is concerned with the structure and influence of relationships with and between 
individuals, organizations and societies (Andriessen & Gubbins, 2009). The concept of social capital 
has become increasingly popular in a wide range of social science disciplines as it has proved to be a 
powerful factor explaining actors’ relative success in conducting social affairs and gaining access to 
critical resources (see e.g. Adler & Kwon, 2002, p. 17). Here we focus on two central typologies of the 
social capital literature which capture important differences between the Western and Russian business 
landscape. After that, we review the previous literature on social capital in Russia using these two 
typologies. 
Bridging and bonding social capital 
According to Putnam (2000), of all the dimensions along which forms of social capital vary, perhaps 
the most important is the distinction between bridging (or inclusive) and bonding (or exclusive): 
Some forms of social capital are, by choice or necessity, inward looking and then reinforce 
exclusive identities and homogenous groups...Other networks are outward looking and 
encompass people across diverse social cleavages. (ibid, p. 22) 
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Further, Putnam argues that bonding social capital is good for undergirding specific reciprocity and 
mobilizing solidarity in a group (good for getting by), while bridging networks are better for linking to 
external assets and for diffusing information (good for getting ahead). 
Although both bonding and bridging social capital can serve as background for collective action, they 
assume different ways of engagement at the level of the individual. In the case of inward-looking 
(bonding) capital, a special role is played by “a certain set of informal values or norms shared among 
members of a group that permit cooperation among them” (Fukuyama, 1997). This means that users of 
bonding capital should be ready to underplay individual goals if they do not match those goals 
associated with the values and norms accepted in the group. Outward-looking (bridging) capital can be 
associated with the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of 
a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition 
(Bourdieu, 1986). In this view, users of bridging capital should be ready to tolerate the identities of 
multiple other actors to get access to the valuable resources they possess. 
At the collective level, differences between bonding and bridging social capital can be associated with 
differences between closure and openness of the network structure. As noted by Gargulio and Benasi 
(2000), the traditional view of social capital stresses the positive effects of network closure—the 
presence of cohesive ties—in promoting a normative environment that facilitates trust and cooperation 
between actors (Coleman, 1988, 1990), while structural hole theory (Burt, 1992, 1997) argues that the 
benefits from social capital stem from the brokerage opportunities created by disperse ties in networks 
rich with structural holes—that is, by the lack of network closure. 
Formal and informal networks of social capital 
Another typology relates to formal and informal social capital networks that individuals use to produce 
or allocate goods and services (Rose, 1998). According to Rose, social networks of an informal nature 
are face-to-face relationships between a limited number of individuals who know each other and are 
bound together by kinship, friendship and propinquity; networks of a formal nature are relationships 
between people as members of formal organizations. Interactions in formal networks are bound by 
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impersonal rules like laws or a corporate code of conduct. Building upon Coleman’s (1990) 
framework, Rose proposes a situational view of social capital: an individual relies on a heterogeneous 
set of social capital networks (formal, informal or both), depending on the incentives and constraints 
affecting how things can get done in a given situation. This approach is interesting because it aims at 
understanding how social capital comes into play when people are confronted with practical issues in 
specific situations. Will they act through formal or informal networks? 
Social capital in Russia 
It was foreseeable that the social capital discussion, originating in the West, would move to the 
countries in the East, of course including Russia—a country of the “hundred friends” and connections 
(Hayoz & Sergeyev, 2003). As far as West-oriented research on social capital was looking at how 
social networks can create value, the research on Russia and other postcommunist countries 
contributed to an understanding of the rather negative sides of social capital (e.g. Crotty, 2006; 
Ledeneva, 1998; Rose, 1998). According to Vedantam’s3 interview with political scientist Robert 
Putnam, the social capital guru, top-down models of governance and resource allocation run counter to 
everything known about how social capital grows (Amsterdam, 2007). Note that in fairness, there are 
also a few studies offering rather optimistic views of social capital in Russian regions (Marsh, 2000; 
Petro, 2001), political networks (Hayoz & Sergeyev, 2003) and networks of entrepreneurs (Batjargal, 
2003). In any case, the extant studies are helpful in describing Russia in terms of bridging-bonding and 
formal-informal typologies of social capital. 
By applying Rose’s (1995) Hourglass Society model to study the environmental movement and civil 
society development in Russia, Crotty (2006) shows that preexisting ties allow various groups of 
Russian actors to generate both bridging and bonding social capital. The problem is that the capital is 
not directed to development of the civil space linking the interests of elites and ordinary citizens. 
Situated in either part of the “hourglass”, these two groups remain separated. A clear warning of 
                                                          
3
 Shankar Vedantam is a science correspondent for NPR, a multimedia news organization and radio program producer (the 
interview is retrieved from http://www.npr.org/people/137765146/shankar-vedantam). 
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Crotty’s paper is that preexisting social ties can result in the rise of inward-looking interest groups in 
Russia’s third sector, pursuing self-interested behaviour under the banner of democratic ideas. Such 
inward-looking groups tend to preserve their stocks of social capital, and in the words of Adler and 
Kwon (2002), the “ties that bind become the ties that blind”. Such behaviour is counterproductive to 
bridging the elite and non-elite groupings and therefore limits development of broader cooperation 
through third-party organizations. 
Overreliance on bonding capital and the limited capacity of bridging capital in Russia also follows 
from research conceptualizing social capital in terms of trust in others. This type of conceptualization 
is shared by leading scholars from various disciplines (see review by Delhey, Newton, & Welzel, 
2011). As noted by Delhey and colleagues, scholars usually distinguish between two forms of trust in 
others: particular trust (also called thick, or specific) involves a narrow circle of familiar others; 
general trust (also called thin, or generalist) concerns a wider circle of unfamiliar others. While 
particular trust is associated with bonding social capital, general trust refers to its bridging component. 
In modern society, which involves daily interactions with strangers, general trust is thought to be more 
important than particular trust (ibid., p. 786). In terms of general trust, Russia along with other post-
communist countries is characterized as a low-trust society (Hayoz & Sergeyev, 2003), a country with 
trust as a missing resource (Sztompka, 1995) or with low radius of trust (Delhey, et al., 2011) and a 
country with a lack of minimal trust (Humphrey & Schmitz, 1998). 
Furthermore, while Russia is associated with a potential contradiction between informal and formal 
networks (Ledeneva, 1998, 2009), it is argued that life and the economy in Western countries rest 
upon a proper balance between formal rules (reinforced by formal organizations) and institutionalized 
norms of behaviour (manifested in informal rules) for interpersonal interactions (North, 1990, p. 36 
cited in Rose 1998). Nationwide reliance on personal or informal networks of social capital has been 
reported by Rose (1998), who characterized Russia as an “anti-modern society”—a society which is 
still characterized by organizational failure or the corruption of formal organizations. According to 
Rose, in such institutional conditions, when formal organizations of state and market do not work 
properly, individuals can respond by invoking networks that involve informal, diffuse social 
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cooperation to compensate for social exclusion by formal organizations. In contrast to this pessimistic 
view, personal networking can be important for fulfilling beneficial functions such as providing safety 
nets, survival kits and social capital to gain access to influentials who can facilitate business 
(Ledeneva, 2009). In a recent overview of Russian business and management research, Puffer and 
McCarthy (2011) argued that Russian managers have relied excessively on personal networks to 
conduct business due to the void created by the lack of legitimacy of the country’s formal institutions. 
Thus, the presence of personal networks with pre-existing ties (or groups of particular trust) is seen an 
important feature of the Russian environment. It is expected that even when dealing with new issues, 
Russian actors may rely on old ties with familiar others. 
Summing up the extant findings, social capital in Russia is often emphasized in terms of its bonding 
rather than bridging component. Furthermore, scholars share a view of a rather parochial mismatch of 
formal and informal social capital networks. Networks of particularistic reciprocity prevail over 
networks of generalist reciprocity. For us these studies are important as they point to institutional 
differences between Russia and the West in terms of social capital. They also locate possible stocks of 
social capital in Russia and offer approaches to assess its positive and negative effects. In this paper 
we follow up and further develop these ideas by offering a more dynamic view of social capital. We 
are interested in understanding how the mismatch between Western and Russian institutions is handled 
in practice when Western cooperation models are implemented in the Russian context. To do so, we 
adopt an action-oriented perspective of Scandinavian institutionalism. 
2.2. Scandinavian institutionalism 
The institutionalist literature that has emerged and developed within Scandinavia is perhaps best 
described as being concerned with how organizational actors respond to institutional pressure in their 
everyday practice (Boxenbaum & Strangaard Pedersen, 2009). This view is different from prevailing 
institutional theory of organization, which often focuses on the structuration of organizational fields 
and regards institutions as norms of stability being either antecedents (old institutionalism) or results 
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(new institutionalism) of organizational action (see Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996, pp. 3-5). To 
Scandinavian institutionalists, new organizational practices emerge from a blend of the actors’ 
intentions and activities associated with institutionalized ideas travelling in time and space. This kind 
of change is neither planned in advance (as new institutionalism would suggest) nor a result of 
adapting to institutions taken for granted (as old institutionalism would suggest). Rather, the ideas 
continuously come into play and can be reflexively addressed by the participating actors to resolve 
their issues in the situation at hand. 
Translation 
As noted by Ritvala and Granqvist (2009), Scandinavian institutionalists, by drawing on the notion of 
translation (Latour, 1986), have produced detailed narratives on adaptations of foreign ideas and 
institutions to local contexts (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996; Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005; Lindberg & 
Czarniawska, 2006). The concept of translation refers to the notion that ideas change when they travel 
from one institutional context to another (Boxenbaum & Strangaard Pedersen, 2009). The translation 
model stresses the importance of friction as the interactive clash between ideas in residence and 
incoming ideas, leading to the transformation of both (Czarniawska, 2008, p. 88). In this view, friction 
is a positive element, as actors give new energy to ideas by interactively changing them according to 
their own frame of reference (ibid.). 
A process of translation often happens through imitating others (Hedmo, Sahlin-Andersson, & Wedlin, 
2005). This happens because actors (people, groups, organizations, cities, even countries) tend to 
imitate those they want to resemble, or, in other words, that they consider successful. As noted by 
Hedmo and colleagues, the results of imitation may be quite different from the imitated model because 
what is being transferred from one setting to another is not an idea or a practice as such but rather 
accounts and materializations of a certain idea or practice (p. 195). These accounts and 
materializations are made by subjective actors in contexts different from the original ones. In the view 
of Scandinavian institutionalists, this kind of work can be understood as innovation as it is always 
complemented by unintended consequences and unique solutions. Actors participating in this work, 
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often both the imitators and the imitated ones, are called editors (Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). According 
to Sahlin-Andersson, editors are purposeful actors contributing to the local implementation of the 
ideas and working to decouple old and new models by applying them to different situations. 
Focusing on the work of editors is a promising approach to understanding how Western ideas are 
translated into the Russian context. For the sake of this research, we are interested in understanding 
whether and how social capital becomes a part of their work. 
2.3. Analytical framework 
Our analytical framework (figure 1) is designed to investigate translation of a foreign cooperation 
model from one institutional context to another. Institutional differences between the contexts are 
viewed in terms of social capital. The foreign (Norwegian or Western) context is associated with a 
prevalence of bridging social capital and a proper balance between formal and informal networks. On 
the other side, the local context (Russia) where the model is implemented is associated with a 
prevalence of bonding social capital and a potential contradiction between formal and informal 
networks. Translating the foreign model in the local context is done by editors—individual actors, be 
they persons, groups or organizations. Translating/editing work happens around friction points where 
the foreign idea clashes with local ideas in residence. This clash happens due to institutional 
differences. We assume that implementing a foreign idea or a model is a cooperative process involving 
various actors with resources. To facilitate cooperation, the editors have to find pragmatic solutions. In 
a network perspective, the actors’ resources can be accessed through either bridging or bonding social 
capital, or both. At the same time, cooperative action is possible through either formal or informal 
networks, or both. 
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Figure 1. Analytical framework: translating a foreign model in a local context. 
Based on this framework, a detailed version of our research question is as follows: How are different 
forms of social capital manifested in the editing work associated with translating a foreign model in a 
local context? Now, it is time to introduce the reader to the context where the translation happened. 
 
3. The empirical context 
3.1. Murmansk region, its industry and economy4 
The Murmansk region is a part of the North-West Federal District of Russia. The region is located on 
the Kola Peninsula, above the Polar Circle, and extends 405 km from north to south and 536 km from 
east to west. The region borders Finland to the west, Norway to the north-west, and the Republic of 
Karelia (another region of the North-West Federal District of Russia) to the south. The region adjoins 
                                                          
4 Material in this section is a compilation of information from the following sources: online newspaper Komsomolskaya 
Pravda (retrieved from http://murmansk.kp.ru/daily/25997.4/2925130/), Russian Federate State Statistics Service 
(www.gks.ru), Government of the Murmansk Region (retrieved from http://www.gov-murman.ru/region/index.php), the 
Institute of Marine Research (Norway, https://www.imr.no), the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (http://www.beac.st/in-
English/Barents-Euro-Arctic-Council) and the US Department of Commerce – National Trade Data Bank (retrieved from 
http://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/industry/docs/mark0241.htm).  
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the Barents and the White Sea respectively on the north and the east. About 300,000 inhabitants 
(nearly 50 percent of the total population) reside in the town of Murmansk. Besides Murmansk there 
are 12 smaller towns, most of them built during the 1930s in relation to the development of local 
deposits of natural resources. 
Murmansk has traditionally been an export-oriented region with an economy based on the rich natural 
resources of the Kola Peninsula and the Barents Sea. The primary exports of the region are nonferrous 
metals, mineral raw materials and food products (mostly fish) and agricultural products. The 
Murmansk economy is dominated by the industrial sector, which accounts for about 90 percent of the 
region’s revenues. The primary industries in the Murmansk region are mining and metallurgy, along 
with fishing, power generation and shipping. Around 10 of the region’s major companies represent 90 
percent of the region’s total production outcome. While some of these companies are owned by the 
Russian state, the others were privatized by commercial groups developed in Russia after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. Regarding regional small and medium-sized businesses, during the 
2000s, their number was around 10,000. Most of them were engaged in trade, construction, real estate 
and manufacturing industries and operated mainly in the local market. 
3.2. New prospects and challenges 
Since the early 2000s, the Russian government has planned the development of the giant Shtokman 
gas field, located in the Barents Sea.
5
 Murmansk-based companies were then ambivalent. They were 
glad for new business opportunities coming to their area, but at the same time, they were afraid of 
competition with more experienced and larger suppliers from outside. Most of the local companies 
operating in the regional market had no experience participating in such complex projects as 
Shtokman. At the same time, their technical profile was very different from what is normally required 
in offshore projects. In the mid-2000s, a Norwegian petroleum company, Statoil, then competing for a 
                                                          
5 Petroleum resources, including offshore fields in the Russian North, have been a priority area in the Russian energy policy 
since the beginning of the 2000s (see, e.g., the Energy Strategy of Russia up to 2020, approved in 2003, and the Energy 
Strategy of Russia up to 2030, approved in 2009, retrieved from http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-
2030_(Eng).pdf). 
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share in Shtokman, started a cooperation program with the Murmansk region aimed at developing the 
local industrial potential. Statoil possessed a solid background from developing the Norwegian 
continental shelf since the 1970s and wanted to use it in Russia. According to StatoilHydro
6
, not more 
than 50 Russian companies in both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk (another Russian region, located 
further east from Murmansk) could be regarded at that time as potential suppliers to Shtokman. By 
contrast, in the Rogaland region of Norway, there are more than 500 companies supplying products 
and services to the petroleum industry. 
 
3.3. Regional association: A Norwegian model to Russia 
The overall goal of Statoil’s initiative in Murmansk was to assist local companies on their way to 
becoming qualified suppliers
7
 of products and services related to the development of the offshore 
projects. In particular, Statoil wanted to assist small and medium business enterprises to improve their 
competence and not least to protect their rights and common interests. This initiative was implemented 
according to the Memorandum of Understanding in Technical and Economic Cooperation between the 
Government of the Murmansk Region and Statoil ASA (signed on August 18, 2005) and resulted in 
the establishment of a regional industry association (hereafter Association). As a prototype model for 
the Association in Murmansk, Statoil used Petro Arctic—an association involved in offshore 
development in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea and headquartered in Hammerfest (the city 
closest to the Snow White gas field on the Norwegian continental shelf). Petro Arctic was established 
by Statoil and other oil companies in 1997 as a membership organization for local firms willing to be 
involved in the petroleum projects. By the mid-2000s Petro Arctic had about 400 members, including 
local, regional, national and international companies from various segments of the supply industry.  
                                                          
6 After the merger of Statoil and the Oil and Gas Division of Norsk Hydro in 2007, StatoilHydro was the name of the joint 
company until fall 2009. Since then the name has been changed to Statoil (source: Statoil). Norsk Hydro also competed for a 
share in the Shtokman project and prior to the merger with Statoil had its own cooperation program with the Russian 
industry. 
7 The petroleum production industry has many levels ranging from petroleum companies and their main contractors down to 
various suppliers—subcontractors supplying products and services to both the offshore and onshore part of a project.  
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The development of such third-party organizations as Petro Arctic in the north can be seen as a natural 
continuation of the development of the Norwegian continental shelf already started in its southern part 
in the 1970s–1990s. This development has proceeded through dialogue between multiple groups, such 
as central and regional authorities, foreign and domestic businesses and local SMEs. Regarding the 
Murmansk region, in the early 2000s, it had no third-party organization ready to direct the whole mass 
of the local companies towards larger projects. However, as reported by Kamayeva (2000), two NGOs 
for business had existed there since early 1990s. They assisted their members in the search for 
business partners and established links between member companies.  
Soon after the formal establishment of the Association in 2006, around 60 local companies became 
members. The framework conditions of the Association were in many ways dependent on changes in 
the Russian oil and gas regimes related to strategic projects like Shtokman (Mineev, 2011, pp. 313-
317). In the summer of 2006, the Russian state company Gazprom, responsible for the Shtokman 
development, rejected all offers from foreign bidders
8
 and announced that it was going to develop the 
field alone, and foreign companies could be involved in the future only as co-investors, not as 
operators. Gazprom’s decision created for Statoil a question mark on the whole idea of the 
Association. However, Statoil decided not to stop supporting the then nearly established Association. 
In 2007, a new round of Shtokman negotiations was initiated, and Gazprom chose Statoil and French 
oil major Total as partners for the development of the Shtokman field infrastructure. Optimism for 
potential suppliers from Murmansk was then growing due to more concrete plans for the development 
of Shtokman by the project owners, who established a special purpose company, Shtokman 
Development AG (SDAG). The Association developed a close cooperation with SDAG, but in 2010, 
due to the global uncertainty of the gas market, SDAG decided to postpone the main investment 
decision about Shtokman.
9
 However, the Association did not dissolve but became quite active in 
directing its members towards other large projects coming to the Russian Arctic, such as, for example, 
the national project Murmansk Transportation Hub. 
                                                          
8
 Besides Norwegian companies Statoil and Hydro, on the short list of bidders were Total (France), Chevron and Conoco 
Phillips (both United States).  
9 Since then this decision has been postponed several times and still had not been made by the time of the submission of this 
paper. 
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By 2010, the Association had about 240 members coming from other Russian regions besides 
Murmansk and even from other countries, such as Norway, Finland, France and the United States, and 
representing various segments of the industry. Formally, it looked similar to Petro Arctic, but in 
practice, it developed much differently from its Norwegian prototype. The political climate around 
Shtokman was not the only reason for the difference. As reported below in this paper, essential 
differences were brought up by local actors in the Murmansk region of Russia. 
 
4. Research approach, data collection and analysis 
4.1. Approach 
The study applies a qualitative research approach. With qualitative methodology comes an 
acknowledgment that the field itself is not just part of the empirical world but is shaped by the 
theoretical interests of the researcher (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006, p. 820). This means that to 
understand social reality, which is emergent, subjectively created, and objectified through human 
interaction (Chua, 1986, p. 615), a researcher needs to develop an interpretation, or a way of knowing 
the field. The interpretation is not pre-given. The practice of doing qualitative studies involves an 
ongoing reflection on the data and its positioning against different theories such that the data can 
contribute to and develop further the chosen research questions (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). In our 
case, data collection was not guided by any specific theory but focused on interactions of various 
actors involved in the implementation of the Norwegian model in Russia. Our theoretical research 
question to analyse activities of the Russian actors by combining Scandinavian institutional theory 
with theory of social capital came as a result of an ongoing reflection on the rich data we collected. 
This kind of approach can be qualified as reflexive interpretation (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009, p. 
271), meaning that one mode of thought is continuously confronted by another. In this fashion, various 
theoretical perspectives were compared with each other and with the data coming from the empirical 
setting of the Murmansk industry. The state of knowing the field changed as the theories were 
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considered and discarded on the way towards the analytical framework presented in section 2. Some 
additional data were collected afterwards to better illustrate concepts included in the framework. 
 
4.2. Data collection 
Access to the data was enabled by the authors’ participation in several research and development 
projects related to the supply industry of North-West Russia during 2006–2011. During these years we 
became acquainted with many people involved in the development of the supply industry, leaders of 
local companies and representatives of the petroleum industry, as well as Norwegian and Russian 
analysts working for either oil companies or research institutions. The data were obtained from various 
sources, including document materials (such as internal and public documents from the website of the 
Association) and presentations and informal talks from about 30 conferences and seminars related to 
industrial development in the Barents region (in which either or both of us participated during the 
period 2006–2011). During these years we also visited several companies in the Murmansk region and 
could then observe their normal work. This data, including documents, informal talks and 
observations, was particularly useful to understand both the historical aspects of the industry and its 
socio-cultural context. 
Furthermore, to develop a more detailed account of the Association, we focused on its development 
through 2005–2011. One of the authors carried out semi-structured and open-ended interviews with 
representatives of local supply companies, members of the Association, its director, and a state 
official, a former member of the working group for the development of the Association. To get a 
broader view, he interviewed several Russian and Norwegian political and business analysts familiar 
with the Association. He also conducted semi-structured interviews with six representatives of Statoil 
who were at different times involved in the development of the Association. In total 22 interviews 
were carried out with 20 individuals in 2007–2011. 
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4.3. Data analysis 
The obtained data were analysed in the following way. First, we constructed a historical account of the 
Association and identified key actors involved in its development from both the Norwegian and the 
Russian side. The history was divided in three phases: (1) Starting up with support from Norway 
(2005–2007), (2) Preparing for self-sufficiency (2008–2009) and (3) Running self-sufficiently (since 
2010). Although the Norwegian actors played an important role by providing both methodological and 
financial support in phase 1, their goal was not to lead the Association but to pass this role to a 
competent third party in Russia. Thus, a lot of work was done to make the Association a self-sufficient 
project to be taken over by its members (phase 2). Phase 3 is associated with independency of the 
Association—since 2010 it has become a totally Russian project. 
In the next step, we identified the main challenges experienced by Russian actors throughout the 
“takeover” of the Association. For us these challenges were observable indicators of frictions in the 
editing process. Two friction points were distinguished: an interpretation dilemma during phase 1, 
since the Russian actors had conflicting perceptions of the Association idea (friction point 1), and a 
self-sufficiency dilemma during phases 2 and 3, when it was unclear whether the Association should 
follow the suggestions of the Norwegian partners or elaborate its own solution for self-sufficiency 
(friction point 2). 
Furthermore, we provide an account of cooperative activities implemented by the Russian actors in 
relation to friction points 1 and 2. At the aggregate level, these activities are characterized as 
mobilizing the local stakeholders in the Murmansk region and motivating them for cooperation, 
building strategic consortia among the members of the Association and integrating the Association 
with external stakeholders. The cooperative activities, relational in nature, served for us as areas where 
we could observe social capital at work (or manifesting social capital, according to the research 
question). The development phases of the association, friction points and cooperative activities are 
mapped together in table 1. 
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Table 1. Development of the Association, friction points and cooperative activities  
Development 
Phases 
Phase 1: 2005–2007 
Starting up with support 
from Norway 
Phase 2: 2008–2009 
Preparing for self-
sufficiency 
Phase 3: 2010–ongoing 
Running self-sufficiently 
Friction 
Points 
Interpretation 
dilemma: What is this 
Association about? 
Self-sufficiency dilemma: 
Ready-made or own solution? 
Cooperative 
activities 
 
Mobilizing local 
stakeholders 
 
Building strategic consortia 
Integrating with external stakeholders 
 
Further analysis of the data focused on the question of how the Russian actors elaborated pragmatic 
solutions to facilitate cooperation. The pragmatic solutions were analysed in terms of two relational 
activities: obtaining cohesiveness and managing diversity. The former is associated with bonding 
social capital, while the latter is about bridging social capital. These two types of activities were 
examined in relation to each friction point and then assessed with view of acting through both formal 
and informal (social capital) networks. A more detailed account of our findings is provided in the next 
section. 
 
5. Findings: How do Russian actors make a project initiated by Norway a 
Russian project? 
 
5.1. Friction point 1: The interpretation dilemma 
The Association project was a part of the Statoil’s Corporate Social Responsibility Program for the 
north-west of Russia. From the Russian side, the project was supervised by the regional government of 
Murmansk (Industry and Transport and Energy Ministry), the Union of Industrialists and 
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Entrepreneurs of the Murmansk region and the Northern Chamber of Commerce and Industry. To 
develop the Association, a working group was established and included representatives from both 
sides. A Russian director for the Association was assigned by the regional government. This person, 
then the vice president of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, was well esteemed both 
among regional officials and in the business community. An industry expert (mentor) from Statoil was 
placed in the Association office to help the director in the starting-up phase for one year in 2006–2007. 
While the Norwegian party took the role of advisor, the Russian partners were supposed to implement 
the work: 
[The] main driving force should be that this was a Russian initiative. Russians had to take 
ownership in the initiative and decide on how to develop the Association. (Project manager 
of Statoil’s supplier program in 2005–2007) 
A prototype was the Petro Arctic network model from Norway, which is maintained and 
financed by the members. . . . We shared our experience and helped to develop strategy for 
the association, website layout, and methods for recruiting members, newsletter and 
magazine, programs for seminars and B2B meetings. . . . The [Russian] director had to 
develop [it] all himself, had to learn how to do it . . . [as a] diplomatic mentor and confident 
director. (Mentor from Statoil, placed in the office of the Association in 2006–2007) 
Statoil’s decision to give the Russian partners “free hand” in developing the Association was 
important for getting local support for the project. However, it created a sort of enigma for the Russian 
side. Such projects in Norway normally assume cooperation between various groups, such as regional 
government, small and medium-sized companies and larger companies of different types, as well as 
companies from outside the region. Often this involves international cooperation. Such diversity is 
probably related to the complexity of oil and gas projects. Naturally, planning the Association 
involved many groups in Murmansk too. But then some disagreements took place. For most of the 
local actors, such a project was unfamiliar, and they lacked experience in this kind of cooperation. 
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Unique broker 
Some disagreements took place among the regional administration officials. They saw differently the 
opportunities and challenges the Association could bring. While some people were sceptical of 
cooperation with a large Western company (as it pursued its own interests), others saw this as a 
potential source of regional income. In addition, it was unclear how to organize cooperation with 
business. The Association director played a key role as a broker. He personally met and negotiated 
with all the involved parties to resolve the issues. He kept explaining that the Association was a 
Russian project crucial for the development of the Murmansk region. As he described this himself: 
In the beginning it was difficult to explain to people that it was a Russian association for 
business, not a Norwegian one. The last argument was used by some oppositionists to show 
that the project was not valuable for Russia. Also, they suggested not including foreign 
companies as members. 
I, with all my weight, personally negotiated with decision makers and refuted the 
oppositionists. . . . In the development of the Association, it was important to maintain 
transparency and publicity. 
The director’s negotiation work was supported by the leader of the Association working group: 
The governor was positive to Statoil’s offer and signed the memorandum of understanding, 
but when practical work started, some problems occurred. . . . Then suggestions for 
concrete actions originated from below. . . . When concrete persons and last names 
appeared in the action plans, there were some tensions at the level of top officials. . . . I had 
to explain to people that we should have been active but not wait for sponsorships and 
actions from Statoil. This was hard to understand for some high officials. Maybe it is our 
old habit, izhdivenchestvo—they [Statoil] need [it], and they will do it. . . . So negotiating 
work was done in the corridors of power to save the idea and put it on the right track. 
(Administration official, leader of the Association working group in 2006) 
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Regarding local industry, quite a few (50–60) companies joined the Association during its starting-up 
phase. At that time, most of them did not play an active role in the Association. The idea was 
unfamiliar and not clear enough for them as well: 
Small and medium-sized Russian companies were eager to become members. However, 
their visions were limited and not long-term market oriented. That was a surprise. (Mentor 
from Statoil, placed in the office of the Association in 2006–2007) 
Personal relations with and high respect for the director was important for the local companies. When 
asked about their motivation to join the Association in 2006, directors from several companies 
mentioned that they could not know in advance what the Association would be. But they felt that it 
was worth joining as they personally knew and trusted its director. In other words, a personal 
invitation from the Association director was itself a motivator to join. He could find the right approach 
to everybody and he was listened to: “Somebody may disagree with him, but clearly everybody here 
respects him very much” (paraphrase from an informal discussion with an employee of Murmansk 
State Technical University). Both the previous ties and brokerage skills of the Association director 
were critical during the take-off of the Association. After all, a good working atmosphere in the 
Association was achieved: 
We had solid support from the governor’s office, both locally and at the political level. They 
communicated with the central government in Moscow, presented for them our cooperation and 
got approval. . . . Then we [Statoil’s project managers] did not need to contact Moscow. (Project 
manager of the Statoil’s supplier program in 2005–2007) 
We really had a good time together and enjoyed our working meetings with the Statoil 
experts. . . . The Association was developed in an atmosphere of friendship and creativity; team 
spirit was important. (Director of the Association) 
 
Local patriotism 
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The local companies perceived the Association as an opportunity to protect their interest against larger 
and more experienced companies from outside. It seems that this shared fear was also an important 
factor motivating them for cohesive cooperation: 
The association and its consortia are for local companies to defend their region. (Director of 
a small construction engineering company, member of the Association) 
It was a good idea to join forces with local companies. For us it was a chance to ensure that 
money does not pass by Murmansk companies. . . . We do not want to be just small workers 
for bigger firms from outside Russia. (Director of another small construction engineering 
company, member of the Association) 
We can see that the reaction of the local companies to new, upcoming projects is that they 
unite in groups, including the Association and its consortia. (Director of the Association) 
The fear of external newcomers was not without reason. As the Association director indicated in the 
interview, he had to dispute with representatives of a Gazprom structure company related to 
Shtokman: 
They came to Murmansk and directly met some local companies. Clearly, this created a lot 
of trouble here. . . . I had to meet them and ask them to stop doing so. (Director of the 
Association) 
As he further explained, this kind of direct selection would create unfavourable conditions for local 
subcontractors since they were too small and separated. At the same time, the process was not 
transparent to others. Thus, for outsiders the Association was positioned as an entrance door to the 
local market. As for local companies, the Association made them more conscious about their shared 
identity with the Murmansk region. 
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5.2. Friction point 2: The self-sufficiency dilemma 
When Statoil started to lessen its methodical and financial involvement, the Russian partners had to 
find methods for the self-sufficient development of the Association. The members then started to 
implement their own entrepreneurial initiatives, using the Association as a platform. One of the 
activities was a consortium (hereafter the Consortium), which was founded in 2008 by the nine largest 
construction companies in the region. This was actually dissimilar to the practice of the Norwegian 
suppliers’ associations like Petro Arctic. Such associations in Norway normally do not include 
commercial substructures but leave their arrangements to the members. The Norwegian partners were 
not active in the practical work with the Consortium. They believed that such substructures would 
move the Association from an open towards a closed network structure. Rather, the suggestion from 
the Norwegian partners was to develop services that various members would be willing to pay for (for 
example, seminar fees and competency development programs). Another suggestion from the 
Norwegian side was to merge the Association with a similar one developed by that time in 
Arkhangelsk—another city where Statoil had a cooperation with the local industry. However, directors 
in both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk abandoned this suggestion. They argued that a distance of more 
than 1,000 km between the two regions and the specificity of the local markets were a huge obstacle 
for cooperation. As stated by the Association director in Murmansk, meaning that the Russian partners 
would decide for themselves: 
Statoil wanted us to be more commercial. But commercialization leads to independency 
[from Statoil] 
In 2010 Statoil stopped financing the Association and became an ordinary member. Although the 
membership fees were raised, most of the members did not leave the Association. The Consortium 
was not the only initiative of the Association, but it played an important role in securing self-
sufficiency of the Association for its local members. In the rest of this section we therefore focus our 
attention on the Consortium.  
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Soviet pride and friendship networks 
By 2010 the Consortium included about 40 local companies (from both industrial and civil 
construction sectors). Nine key regional companies, who founded the Consortium, had entered its 
Council. The directors of these companies had important commonalities. Most of them were energetic 
middle-aged men with professional backgrounds from the industry, even going back to the centralized 
Soviet system. Although today they are leaders of commercial companies, many of them are educated 
engineers or technicians with about 20–30 years of experience working in the construction industry in 
the Murmansk region. Their Soviet industry background seemed to be an important element to secure 
the coherence of their actions: 
Vertically-integrated companies, such as those in the Soviet Union, are very important in 
the construction industry for combining resources and having responsibility for the whole 
process. Otherwise, nobody is responsible for anything. (Director of a member company, 
hereafter Director B) 
We had it all in the Soviet Union [coordination between organizations in the same 
industry] . . . but then this was a planned economy with no market. Now we try to rebuild 
the cooperation again, although in new conditions. (Director of a member company, 
hereafter Director C) 
Signs of the Soviet past associated with hierarchical power structures were present in the official 
memorandum of the Consortium. The memorandum differentiated between the decision-making rights 
of the Council members (nine founding companies) and the ordinary members. One of the board 
members commented on this (Director D): 
To understand the difference between the rights of the board companies and the others, one 
may refer to the difference between majority and minority shareholders in an open joint 
stock company. All may contribute to decisions, but in accordance with their shares. 
The strategic decisions (for example, participation in a tender) were made by the Council, and then 
they were distributed down to the member companies. None of the ordinary members interviewed 
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indicated feelings of oppression from being limited in their rights. It seems that the ordinary members 
trusted the board, and the board could rely on the ordinary members: 
The board companies are making decisions; they stand for their subcontractors. Otherwise, 
if 40 people participate in the meeting, it would be like a bazaar, but not decision making. 
(Director B) 
The Consortium was more a network of persons than one of organizations. But these persons 
addressed each other as strong leaders, able to mobilize their organizations. Director B commented in 
this respect: 
If we [directors] manage to come to an agreement with one another, then we would be able 
to secure cooperation between the employees of our companies. 
We can always sit down and talk together. . . . Surely we will come to an agreement about 
how to share a project. 
The next quote illustrates the importance of personal ties, a shared feeling of local patriotism and a 
sort of nostalgia about the past: 
Young businessmen think in different categories than we do: they want to conquer the 
market. But we want to develop our region. . . . We will cooperate with a young newcomer 
if, for example, he comes to us and says that he helps his father or uncle, who has vast 
experience in the construction industry, to contribute to the Murmansk region. . . . No 
matter what company they are from, old and well-esteemed specialists [with Soviet 
industry background] are always listened to with respect at our meetings. (Director C). 
It seems that personal ties, even friendship, were an important element binding the Consortium leaders 
together. They knew one another quite well, and this was important for their willingness to share risks 
and join resources in new projects: 
We meet regularly on different occasions and share information. . . . We have all known 
each other for many years, and we are specialists; at the same time, we are leaders of the 
companies and friends taking responsibility for each other. 
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However, some fear and appreciation of internal competition were also evident in the interviews: 
We still do not know exactly if we would have to share or compete . . . but if we compete, 
we would like to do it in a civilized way. (Director C) 
In this setting everybody was known and visible and could check on everybody else. In such 
transparent conditions, it is rational to be cooperative. For example, Director B mentioned in an 
interview: 
The Murmansk and Kola region is a small place with only one road coming in. . . . Once 
anybody enters it, we know all about what happens to him. . . . You can cheat only 
once. . . . People understand that it is much better to be a good player and take 
responsibility. 
Being unsure of the market situation but believing in personal relations, the Consortium members 
attempted to create an informal and friendly atmosphere of trust. This seemed to be a favourable 
condition for relatively fast decision making. However, not everybody but only well-known and high-
esteemed individuals could be included in the cooperation. Less well-known people were not 
excluded, but the Consortium board decided to give newcomers trial orders—small construction works 
to see whether they could be later trusted for larger works, where many parties can be dependent on 
each other: 
We have to check out strange partners coming in with exploratory contracts. . . . Not every 
company is trustworthy. A couple companies have already been pushed out. (Director D) 
While the Consortium included around 40 members in 2010, other companies working in the local 
construction market (more than 200 smaller companies) were out of scope of this cooperation. Some 
of them did not even know about the Consortium. Moreover, at least some of them appeared lost, as 
can be seen in an interview with a technical director of a company that was not a member of the 
Consortium: 
We and many other construction companies do not cooperate because there is nobody 
showing us how to do it, and we lack leaders. . . . As for the Association and the 
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Consortium, it is like a club which is not open for everybody. . . . I do not even know what 
they do there. 
In addition, this informant mentioned that he had two brothers who also worked in the 
construction industry in Murmansk, but they did not cooperate (although to him this would 
have been natural). Thus, the role of the Consortium in the development of the whole region 
was a bit questionable. On the one hand, it positioned itself as a regional actor and enjoyed 
political and informational support from the authorities. On the other hand, some companies 
were not a part of the preparation for the large projects coming into region. The Consortium 
was a strong network of influential people, but at the same time, it was not completely open 
for everybody. 
 
Putting business and politics together 
The director of the Association played an active role in the Consortium as facilitator. The first 
meetings of the Consortium were held in the office of the Association. Only members of the 
Association could become members of the Consortium. This also secured the Association solid 
political support as the Consortium was a part of the agenda of the Association board. That board 
included high-ranked government officials. After a change of governor in Murmansk in 2009, even 
higher-ranking officials than before received places on the Association board, thus securing solid 
political support. According to the Association director, the new governor, who previously occupied a 
top position in the federal government in Moscow, was interested in cooperation with the Association: 
Soon after a new governor arrived in Murmansk, I attended a meeting with him. This 
confirms the importance of the Association. The governor was interested in identifying all 
“healthy” initiatives in Murmansk and contributing to further development. 
Later on, in 2010, the director of the Association was appointed as advisor for the new governor to 
coordinate the development of oil and gas and infrastructure projects in the region. In 2013, and after 
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the time of this research, the director was assigned as a deputy governor of the Murmansk region (by 
then a new governor had been assigned in the Murmansk region); then he left the director’s position 
and became the chairman of the Association. 
The appearance of high-ranking officials on the Association board has always been considered a 
valuable achievement and presented in press releases and news about the Association on its website 
and in local media. In this way the Association acquired strong political support. One of the sound 
achievements of the Association was the possibility to receive reimbursement from the regional funds 
up to 50 percent of a member’s expenses related to the implementation of ISO 9000 management 
quality standards, which is crucial for oil and gas–related projects. Another important accomplishment 
was the development of links with external stakeholders, such as Shtokman Development Company 
(SDAG), Gazprom, other petroleum companies and main contractors. If the Association had not been 
a regional project, supported by the local government, it would have found it difficult to achieve 
inclusion as a cooperative partner in the local content policy of SDAG. The Consortium was then 
actively positioned towards SDAG, which participated in technical consultations with the Association 
in Murmansk. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relations that had developed around the Association and Consortium by 2010.
10
 
By then the Consortium Council was planning to establish a joint company, “little SDAG,” as they 
themselves characterized it, meaning that it would be a project management company. The 
Association board approved this decision, and it was decided that the Association would be one of the 
founders of the new company.
11
 At the same time, several representatives of the Consortium Council, 
including the directors of the largest construction company (the lead company for joint projects), were 
elected onto the board of the Association. A representative of the local office of SDAG (deputy) was 
also invited to join the board of the Association. Figure 2 illustrates that the Association network was 
                                                          
10
 This figure is made as a result of the analysis of press releases of the Association, reports from the board and member 
meetings, and news published on the Association’s website. 
11
 Later on, after this research was implemented, the joint company was established, but we did not follow its development 
and ownership structure. We assume it could be subject to changes while the company was materialized, but the Shtokman 
project was subject to changes and postponement. Here we exemplify only how the Russian actors mobilized their 
relationships when they addressed the challenge to develop a self-sufficient cooperation.  
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put together by means of both formal organizational and formal personal ties. While the main broker 
in this cooperation was, of course, the dedicated director of the Association, several other persons can 
be characterized as mediators. The mediators represented other organizations, such as the local 
government, parliament and SDAG, in the board of the Association. Local company actors—directors 
of nine founding Consortium companies—were integrated into this network. The network structure 
included both political and business actors and to some extent mixed them up (for example, through 
the board of the Association). The network presented in figure 2 should not be regarded as a fixed 
structure, as the Association was still an ongoing project. Rather, figure 2 should be viewed as a 
snapshot of the Association when it was concerned with the self-sufficiency dilemma. 
 
 
Figure 2. Relations around the Association as of 2010. 
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5.3. Summary of the findings 
The findings are summarized in figure 3. The development of the Association proceeded through work 
around two friction points: the interpretation dilemma and the self-sufficiency dilemma. At each of 
these points, the Russian actors had to address two relational problems: managing diversity and 
obtaining cohesiveness. The first problem is associated with bridging social capital, while the second 
one is about bonding social capital. Diversity of interests and opinions around the interpretation 
dilemma was managed by the unique broker. Later on, when dealing with the self-sufficiency 
dilemma, diversity was managed via new organizational forms (such as the Consortium and board of 
the Association) which connected both political and business actors. Cohesiveness of cooperative 
action was achieved through shared local patriotism when dealing with the interpretation dilemma, and 
through shared identity through the Soviet past and friendship networks. 
 
Figure 3. Summary of the findings. 
Organizational and interpersonal relationships in the Association had been intertwined since the very 
beginning (due to strong previous ties) and became even more diffuse when organizational structures 
around the Association were formalized but still depended on interpersonal relations. This interaction 
helped the Russian actors to both manage diversity and obtain cohesiveness, but at the same time, we 
can observe signs of a closed network structure. 
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6. Discussion  
The research question of this paper was, how are different forms of social capital manifested in the 
editing work associated with translating a foreign (Norwegian) model in a local (Russian) context? 
Our findings suggest that both bonding and bridging social capital were present in the translation 
process and that action took place both through informal and formal networks. Focusing on the 
process of editing work (Sahlin-Andersson 1996) allowed us to see how the different forms of social 
capital came into play and interacted with each other. The translated Norwegian model proved 
workable in its home context, which was rich with bridging social capital and structural holes (Burt 
1992) between established formal organizations. To implement such a model, the Russian actors had 
to build bridging social capital and establish links between various formal organizations and groups 
who previously did not cooperate in this way. Bridging capital was built out of bonding capital with 
the help of informal social capital networks. Bonding social capital then manifested in terms of a 
shared feeling of local patriotism, values related to the Soviet past and norms of reciprocity and 
friendship. These sources of bonding capital were consciously addressed by the members of the 
Association. This exemplifies that social capital becomes a workable resource when its bearers start to 
consciously address it.  
The driving force for the formal social capital network developed around the Association was not 
formal organizations, which, as it normally happens in the West, build their networks with the help of 
people (boundary spanners or brokers) representing them. Instead, the driving force was informal 
network of people centred on a unique broker, who translated their relations to new organizational 
forms, such as the board of the Association and the Consortium. Speaking in terms of our analytical 
framework, various types of bonding social capital manifested in the process of translation, which 
resulted in more bridging social capital. The Association network (presented in figure 2) linked 
together various actors, both individual and organizational ones. Dependence on bonding capital 
seemed to have lessened due to formalization of personal ties. Thus, informal networks were partially 
translated into formal ones. 
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Our study reveals several paradoxes around the Association network. There we find the coexistence of 
cooperation ideas from the modern West and the Soviet past, complex interlinks between business and 
politics, simultaneous closure and openness of the network cooperation and a combination of 
hierarchical and flat organizational structures. The adopted theoretical perspective of 
translation/editing made such observations possible. In the process of translating, or organizing, such 
paradoxes constantly appear because the process is associated with frictions. Conflicting issues 
emerge but cannot be completely resolved. Only temporary (or hybrid-type) solutions are found. 
According to Sahlin-Andersson (1996), editors work to decouple old and new models by applying 
them to different situations. Making a project initiated by Norway a “Russian project” was an act of 
translation, or institutional work (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009), where the Russian actors 
consciously addressed their exposure to various institutional orders. When the legitimacy of action in 
relation to one order was challenged, reference to another one made the cooperation possible. For 
example, when the international background of the project was questioned by some sceptics (local 
officials), the editors worked to construct an image of the Association as a Russian project and made 
reference to local values, such as protecting the regional industrial potential. At the same time, 
convincing the regional administration to engage in an open-minded cooperation, and therefore break 
with the culture of particularistic trust, was possible when reference was made to best practices from 
Norway, a country successful in solving similar issues. Sometimes the lack of a formal institutional 
framework was compensated for by personal relationships. Then, inspiration came from cultural-
cognitive institutions (Scott 2008, 56-59) such as values of friendship (particularistic reciprocity) and a 
shared identity of the Soviet past. 
A potential theoretical contribution of this paper is related to viewing social capital as an integrative 
part of editing work or, more generally, an organizing process. This is different from the mainstream 
literature in the field of organization. There, most of the studies are interested in measuring the level of 
social capital and its effects on organizational performance (see for example Leana and Pil 2006). A 
specific condition of our research is that social capital is rather an analytical layer (to describe editing) 
than an empirical object open for measurement. This approach allows an understanding of how people 
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look for unique solutions rather than follow norms of appropriateness logics (March and Olsen 2004) 
- “what a person like me would do in a situation like that.” Such appropriateness in contemporary 
Russia, in Rose’s (1998) terms, would be to turn to anti-modern behaviour and bend formal 
organization while coping with standard life situations. In contrast, looking at an unknown situation 
associated with institutional conflicts and dilemmas, our study highlighted the ability of the Russian 
actors to innovate and build platform for cooperation in new industrial projects. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The general purpose of this paper was to explore how Russian actors made a project initiated by 
Norway a Russian project. Although Norway and Russia are neighbours geographically, they have a 
long institutional distance (Dikova 2012) in between, as Western economies and transitional 
economies typically do. In this respect, this paper highlights how fundamental differences between 
West and East are managed in practice. Seen through the action-oriented perspective of Scandinavian 
institutionalism, the implementation of the Norwegian model in Russia was about managing frictions 
between institutions attached to the model and the local institutions in Russia. The institutional 
differences were conceptualized with help of theory of social capital. 
Our findings offer new insight to the literature claiming that personal networks and pre-existing ties 
play a crucial role in cooperation processes in Russia (Puffer and McCarthy 2011; Crotty 2006; 
Ledeneva 2009; Rose 1998; Hayoz and Sergeyev 2003; Puffer, McCarthy, and Boisot 2010). While 
pre-existing ties and groups of bonding social capital were seen by Crotty (2006) as a reason for 
failure of third-party organizations, our case highlighted a third-party project (The Association) 
successfully bridging various groups, although lack of initial bridging ties and formal social capital 
networks was compensated by pre-existing ties and personal networks. It looks like more concrete 
business issues, such as preparation for an industrial project as in our case, may provide a more 
conducive ground for organizing bridging activities in Russia than rather abstract ideas of civicness 
such as environmentalism as in Crotty’s case. Furthermore, as suggested by Ledeneva (2009), in the 
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long run, informal tactics compromise the chance of reaching strategic goals of modernization in 
Russia because they among other things undermine the fundamental principle of separation of powers. 
In our study, the Association became a place where the power of various actors was consolidated in 
one effort. However, such a consolidation was important as it constituted a regional bottom-up 
initiative. 
Our study provides a twofold contribution in response to the call from Puffer and McCarthy (2011) for 
further development of both a theory of Russian management and a Russian theory of management. 
The first part of the call is about new ways to understand Russia. Here we have demonstrated that 
Russian actors have cooperative capacity in spite of short supply of bridging social capital and weak 
formal networks. This capacity is associated with networks of bonding social capital, which becomes a 
resource when consciously addressed by the participants. To formalize their relationships, Russian 
actors can utilize a degree of freedom which is absent in the West (due to highly institutionalized 
relationships). While in our Russian case cohesiveness of action and access to diverse resources was 
achieved though mixing business and politics, in the West there is no legitimate room for such 
cooperation. The second part of the call has to do with learning from the Russian experience. 
Overreliance on bridging social capital and formal organizations in the West can be unfavourable. In 
today’s growing complexity of formal organization, particularistic trust, associated with bonding 
social capital, is diminishing. However, if formal organization comes to a critical point, its repair will 
require cohesive action associated with higher risks, responsibilities and interventions. In this case the 
experience of Russia is valuable. There, when faced with critical issues, groups of bonding capital can 
be centers for more responsibility and collective action. 
We see further potential of action-oriented studies of social capital both outside and inside Russia. At 
present, the whole Arctic is considered a future resource base where local communities experience 
pressure from the extractive industry. In this respect we invite more studies of rural contexts under 
external pressure. Another research opportunity would be to explore in more detail how the Soviet 
administrative heritage is manifested in management and business practices of contemporary Russia. 
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Is this a path dependency and disadvantage (e.g. Dixon, Meyer, and Day 2007) or a source of 
inspiration for the future as we found in our case? 
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